In model-based mutation testing, a test model is mutated for test case generation. The resulting test cases are able to detect whether the faults in the mutated models have been implemented in the system under test. For this purpose, a conformance check between the original and the mutated model is required. The generated counterexamples serve as basis for the test cases. Unfortunately, conformance checking is a hard problem and requires sophisticated verification techniques. Previous attempts using an explicit conformance checker suffered state space explosion. In this paper, we present several optimisations of a symbolic conformance checker using constraint solving techniques. The tool efficiently checks the refinement between non-deterministic test models. Compared to previous implementations, we could reduce our runtimes by 97%. In a new industrial case study, our optimisations can reduce the runtime from over 6 hours to less than 3 minutes.
Introduction
Mutation testing is a fault-based software testing technique that receives growing interest [1] . Yet, it is still perceived as being costly and impractical. This remains a barrier to wider uptake within industry. In this paper, we report how these costs can be reduced for a particularly hard problem in mutation testing: the generation of test cases from mutated, non-deterministic models.
Mutation testing is a technique for assessing and improving a test suite [2, 3] . A number of faulty versions of a program under test are produced by injecting bugs into its source code. These faulty programs are called mutants. A tester analyses if a given test suite can kill all mutants. We say that a test kills a mutant if it is able to distinguish the mutant from the original. The tester improves his test suite until all faulty mutants get killed. Unfortunately, the method is not that straightforward, because not all mutants are faulty, i.e., not all injected faults cause observable failures. For example, injected faults in dead code have no effect. Such mutants cannot be killed as they are behaviourally equivalent to the original and are therefore called equivalent mutants. These mutants need to be singled out by other means than testing. Traditionally, this has been done by manual inspection. However, as we demonstrate in this paper, modern program verification techniques can efficiently deal with equivalent mutants.
We focus on model-based mutation testing. It combines ideas from mutation testing and model-based testing. Model-based testing (sometimes also specification-based testing) is a black-box testing technique that avoids the labour of manually writing hundreds of test cases. Instead the expected behaviour of the system under test (SUT) is captured in a model. The test cases are automatically generated from this model [4] . Such models that serve as input for automatic test case generation are called test models. The test model is more abstract than the SUT itself and should focus on the aspects of the SUT to be tested. The technique is receiving growing interest in the embedded-systems domain, where models are the rule rather than the exception [5] .
In model-based mutation testing, we view the SUT as a black box. Hence, we have no access to the source code and consequently, cannot mutate it. Therefore, we mutate a model of the SUT. This original model is assumed to be correct with respect to some properties derived from the requirements. This can be assured, e.g., via model checking. Then, given the original model and a set of mutated models, we automatically generate test cases that kill the model mutants. The generated test cases are abstract and need to be mapped to the concrete interface level of the SUT. The process is shown in Figure 1 . Note that the aim is not to test models, but to generate test cases that cover certain faults. These faults are modelled by mutating the test models. The mutation is fully automated via mutation operators, i.e., syntactic rules for injecting faults.
Equivalent mutants are singled out automatically. Hence, in contrast to program mutation, where we analyse a given set of test cases, here we generate a test suite that will kill all (non-equivalent) mutants. This is non-trivial, since it involves an equivalence check between original and mutated models. Since equivalence is undecidable in general, we restrict ourselves to bounded domains. How such an efficient checker can be implemented with a constraint solver is the topic and main contribution of this paper.
The situation is even more interesting when we consider non-deterministic models. In a non-deterministic model, a given (sequence of) input stimuli may cause several possible output observations. Non-determinism may be required due to non-deterministic behaviour of the SUT or because of abstraction, which characterises good test models. When comparing two non-deterministic models, an original and a mutant, equivalence is insufficient. A (pre-)order relation is needed. Refinement is such an order relation [6] . In this paper, we show how a refinement checker can effectively analyse a large number of mutated models.
Compared to our previous work [7, 8] , we have reduced the test case generation time by 97%. In a further case study, we demonstrate that our optimisations reduce the test case generation time from more than 6 hours to 2.2 minutes. The specific contributions of this work are the optimisation techniques, their implementation via a constraint solver, and the detailed experimental results. This article is an extension of a previous conference paper on optimisations for refinement checking [9] . It also includes optimisation techniques recently published [10] . The main novel items are the construction of actual test cases and a new larger industrial case study that evaluates all of our optimisations.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces preliminaries, i.e., our modelling language and our notion of refinement. Section 3 explains the principles of refinement checking and Section 4 focuses on our techniques for increasing its efficiency. In Section 5, test case construction is explained, i.e., how the results obtained from the refinement check can be transformed into useful test cases. Section 6 presents our experimental results with a car alarm system and a particle counter, which is an industrial use case. We present related work in Section 7 and in Section 8, we draw our conclusions.
Preliminaries

Action Systems
Our chosen modelling formalism are action systems [11] , which are wellsuited to model reactive and concurrent systems [12] . They have a formal semantics with refinement laws and are compositional [13] . Many extensions exist, but the main idea is that a system state is updated by guarded actions that may be enabled or not. If no action is enabled, the action system terminates. If several actions are enabled, one is chosen non-deterministically. Hence, concurrency is modelled in an interleaving semantics.
Syntax. There exist various versions of Back's original action system notation [11] . The syntax we use is defined in Figure 2 . It contains some Prolog elements, since our refinement checking tool is implemented in Prolog. An action system model M consists of basic definitions D, action definitions A, and a do-od block P . D comprises the definition of types t, the declaration of variables v of type t, the definition of the system state as a variable vector v, and the definition of the initial state as a vector of constants c. An action A is a labelled guarded command with label L, guard g and body B. Actions may have a list of parameters X. The body of an action may assign an expression e to a variable v or it may be composed of (nested) guarded commands itself. Action bodies may be composed by sequential composition ; or non-deterministic choice []. The dood block P provides the event-based view on the action system. It composes the actions by their action labels l via non-deterministic choice.
Semantics. The semantics of programs is often encoded via static single assignment (SSA) form [14] . Yet for our refinement check the SSA form is not suitable. For action systems, the formal semantics is typically defined in terms of weakest preconditions. However, for our constraint-based approach we chose a relational predicative semantics, which is very similar to a constraint satisfaction problem. We follow the style of He and Hoare's Unifying Theories of Programming (UTP) [15] . Figure 3 presents our formal semantics of the actions of our modelling language. The state-changes of actions are defined via predicates relating the pre-state of variables v and their post-state v . Furthermore, the labels form a visible trace of events tr that is updated to tr whenever an action runs through. Hence, a guarded action's transition relation is defined as the conjunction of its guard g, its body B and the adding of the action's label l to the previously observed trace. In case of parameters X, these are added as local variables to the predicate. An assignment updates one variable x with the value of an expression e and leaves the rest unchanged. For sequential composition, there must exist an intermediate state v 0 that can be reached from the first body predicate and from which the second body predicate can lead to its final state. Finally, non-deterministic choice is defined as disjunction. The semantics of the do-od block is as follows: while actions are enabled in the current state, one of the enabled actions is chosen non-deterministically and executed. An action is enabled in a state if it can run through, i.e., if a post-state exists such that its semantic predicate can be satisfied. The action system terminates if no action is enabled. The labelling of actions is non-standard and has been added in order to support an event-view for testing.
Conformance Relation
Once the modelling language with a precise semantics is fixed, we can define what it means that a SUT conforms to a given reference model, i.e., if the
=df B ∨ B Figure 3 : Predicative semantics of actions observations of a SUT confirm the theory induced by a formal model. This relation between a model and the SUT is called conformance relation.
In model-based mutation testing, the conformance relation plays an additional role. It defines if a syntactic change in a mutant represents an observable fault, i.e., if a mutant is equivalent to the original model or not. For our nondeterministic models, useful conformance relations are relations relying on some ordering from abstract to more concrete models. One of these order relations is refinement, which uses implication to define conformance. A concrete implementation I refines an abstract model M , iff the implementation implies the model. The following definition of refinement relies on UTP [15] giving M and I a predicative semantics.
. . be the set of variables denoting observations before execution and v = x , y , . . . denoting the observations afterwards. Then
We developed a mutation testing theory based on this notion of refinement [16] . The key idea is to find test cases whenever a mutated model
Hence, we are interested in counterexamples to refinement. From Definition 1, it follows that such counterexamples exist if and only if implication does not hold: 
We see that an unsafe state can lead to an incorrect next state. In modelbased mutation testing, we are interested in generating test cases that cover such unsafe states. Hence, our fault-based testing criteria are based on the notion of unsafe states. How we search for unsafe states in action systems is discussed in the next section. j respectively, which are combined via the non-deterministic choice operator. The observations in our action system language are the system states and the event traces before (v, tr) and after one execution (v , tr ) of the do-od block. Then, a mutated action system AS M refines its original version AS O if and only if all observations possible in the mutant are allowed by the original. Hence, our notion of refinement is based on both, event traces and states. However, in an action system not all states are reachable from the initial state. Therefore, reachability has to be taken into account. We reduce the general refinement problem of action systems to a step-wise simulation problem only considering the execution of the do-od block from reachable states:
Definition 3. (Refinement of Action Systems) Let AS
O and AS M be two action systems with P O (v, v , tr, tr ) and P M (v, v , tr, tr ) being their corresponding do-od blocks. Furthermore, we assume the existence of a function "reach" that returns the set of reachable states for a given trace in an action system. Then
This definition is different to Back's original refinement definition for action systems, which is solely based on state traces [13] . Here, also the possible event traces are taken into account. Hence, also the action labels have to be refined.
Negating this refinement definition and considering the fact that the dood block is a non-deterministic choice of actions A i (v, v , tr, tr ) leads to the non-refinement condition for two action systems:
By applying the distributive law, we bring the disjunction outwards and obtain a set of constraints for detecting non-refinement. 
We use this property in our refinement checking process, which is composed of several steps. The process step find mutated action is a preprocessing activity to check for refinement regardless of reachability. It uses Theorem 1 for which it is sufficient to satisfy one of the sub-constraints of the form
in order to find non-conformance. Hence, it is possible to perform a non-refinement check action by action of the mutant. Thereby, we pass smaller constraint systems to the solver. If there does not exist an unsafe state at this point, we cannot find any mutated action that yields non-conformance and we already know that the action systems are equivalent. If we find an unsafe state in this phase, we cannot be sure that it is reachable from the initial state of the action system. But we know which action has been mutated and are able to construct a non-refinement constraint, which is the sub-constraint that could be satisfied. It describes the set of unsafe states. The next step performs a reachability analysis and uses the non-refinement constraint to test each reached state whether it is an unsafe state. Note that the step normalise in the beginning of the process is new and will be explained below.
We implemented our technique in SICStus Prolog 1 (version 4.1.2). SICStus comes with an integrated constraint solver clpfd (Constraint Logic Programming over Finite Domains) [17] , which we used. The result of our refinement check is: (a) the verdict equiv, which means that the mutated action system conforms to the original, or (b) an unsafe state and a sequence of actions leading to this state. In the latter case, the trace to the unsafe state will be extended to a test case (box test case construction at right bottom of Figure 4 ). For a more detailed description of our individual refinement checking steps and the used algorithms, we refer our previous work [7] . In the following, we concentrate on improvements of our preliminary approach to increase its efficiency. Furthermore, we explain the test case construction.
Efficient Refinement Checking
Quantifier Elimination and Normal Form
A standard approach for turning a program into a constraint satisfaction problem is to convert it into SSA form at first and then replace sequential composition by conjunction. This is not possible in our refinement check due to the required negation. Negating a sequential composition encoded via SSA form may lead to false counterexamples [8] . Hence, we have to use the general definition of sequential composition, which is also used in UTP [15] . Thereby, we gain a relational predicative semantics (see Figure 3) . If sequential composition is used in the original action system, it has to be negated for our non-refinement check (see Section 2.2). Hence, we get the following constraints
This constraint system uses universal quantification, which is not supported by common constraint solvers. Fortunately, we are able to resolve this problem by application of the so-called one-point rule: (∃x : x = e ∧ P (x)) ⇔ P (e). It says that if the variable is fixed to one value, it is possible to substitute the value for the variable and eliminate existential quantification. Note that our semantics incorporates identity assignments x := e = df x = e ∧ y = y ∧ ... ∧ z = z (cf. Figure 3 ). In this way, no variable assignment is lost by this substitution, which also constitutes an optimisation as the constraints passed to the constraint solver are reduced in terms of the number of used variables.
However, the application of the one-point rule is only possible if the lefthand side of sequential composition is deterministic, i.e., it binds the variable to one value. This is the case for assignments. Nevertheless, constructs like ∃ x 0 : ((x 0 = 1 ∨ x 0 = 2) ∧ x = x 0 + 1) are possible. Here, the left-hand side of sequential composition is not deterministic and we cannot substitute since we do not know which value will be assigned to x. We can avoid such problems by introducing a normal form which requires that non-deterministic choice is always the outermost operator and not allowed in nested expressions. In this way, the left-hand side of a sequential composition is always deterministic and existential quantification can be eliminated. In predicate logic, this required normal form corresponds to the disjunctive normal form (DNF). Hence, each action system can be automatically normalised.
We implemented the normalisation and the application of the one-point rule in Prolog: as depicted in Figure 4 , we first normalise the action systems. Nondeterministic choice is then always the outermost operator. Hence, all branching happens at the beginning of each iteration through the do-od block. The application of the one-point rule is implemented via symbolic execution during the translation of the do-od block. Note that our symbolic execution is simpler than in the general case as no branching occurs in between. In each guard, we replace all references to variables by their current symbolic values. Consecutive guards are combined via conjunction leading to our path condition. At each assignment, we update the symbolic value for the assigned variable. At the end of each path, the final symbolic value for each variable v i is added to the path condition pc. Having a lookup function symbVal that takes a variable and returns its symbolic value, we have:
Example 1. As an example, consider the following code snippet of an action set a b that sets two Boolean variables a and b in an arbitrary order. Note that #= denotes our equality operator and := the assignment operator. The arbitrary order is modelled by the sequential composition (;) of two nondeterministic choices ([ ]). Line 2 non-deterministically either sets a or b. Subsequently, the other variable is set. After normalisation, we have: Given unprimed variables a and b as initial values and primed variables a and b as final values, our translation of this action yields the following constraints:
The encoding of the action to build the trace has been omitted in this example. The first and last constraints are unsatisfiable. They represent infeasible paths.
Variable and Value Selection Heuristics
So far, our implementation always used the default settings of SICStus Prolog's integrated constraint solver clpfd [17] . One obvious action that should be tried out to improve performance is to adjust these settings. We modified the search strategy of the constraint solver by trying different combinations of variable and value selection strategies. By default, variables are selected from left to right (leftmost). Other variable selection strategies include the first-fail principle (ff ), which selects the variable with the smallest domain, and the most-constrained heuristic (ffc), which selects the variable that has the smallest domain and the most constraints suspended on it. For value selection, the default is to try values in ascending order (up). The other alternative is to use descending order (down).
Mutation Detection Strategies
It is possible to reduce the size of the constraint systems that have to be processed by the constraint solver. As already explained above, the non-refinement condition presented in Theorem 1 is a disjunction of constraints of which each deals with one action A M i of the mutated action system AS M . Hence, it is sufficient to satisfy one of these sub-constraints in order to prove non-conformance. We have to find the mutated action A M i in order to construct the non-refinement constraint representing the set of unsafe states. For actions that have not been mutated, this set would be empty. So far, mutation detection has been realised by passing our non-refinement constraints to the constraint solver one after the other for each action of the mutated action system. This has the advantage that only "real" semantical mutations are detected, but is rather demanding in terms of runtime. A simpler and faster way to identify the mutated action is to perform mutation detection on a syntactic level, i.e., by comparing the source code of the actions. For this, we have to consider the definitions of the actions. Additionally, their calls in the do-od block are important, where parameters could be manipulated, e.g., parameters could be replaced by constants or other variables. Our syntactic comparison is not sensitive to the renaming of parameters and local variables, which are represented by Prolog variables. This is implemented via SICStus Prolog's term utilities library. The predicate variant/2 checks whether two terms are identical modulo renaming of variables.
Our syntactic check requires some pre-conditions. Firstly, we do not support overloading of actions, i.e., each action is uniquely identified by its name. There must not exist two actions having the same name but a different number of parameters. Furthermore, we suppose that no action call is added/deleted from the do-od block by mutation operators. Note that actions may still be added/deleted from the transition relation by weakening/strengthening their guards. Finally, we do not allow the mutation of data types. If some of these pre-conditions are violated, we possibly miss a mutation. Our implementation checks the last assumption: each type defined in the original and in the mutated action system must have the same definition. The other assumptions are not checked automatically. Hence, we implemented our mechanism for finding the mutated action conservatively: If we cannot find any mutated action syntactically, we perform our semantic mutation detection strategy.
Pre-computation of Reachable States
So far, our refinement check between one original action system and a set of corresponding mutants has been implemented as described in Alg. 1. The input is one original action system (as) and a set of corresponding mutated action systems (mutants). All action systems are supposed to be in normal form. The result is a map unsafes linking the mutants and their unsafe states. The algorithm iterates over the set of mutants (Line 3). The variable s represents the current state of the original action system, which is the initial state in the beginning (Line 4). Successor states are retrieved by the procedure findNextState (Line 13). It implements a breadth-first search, whereas it does not explore any state more than once (by maintaining a list of visited states). To ensure termination, it stops exploration at a user-specified depth limit. At each call, it returns the next reached state or nil in case of termination. Each state is tested whether it is an unsafe state (Line 8). If this is the case, the state space exploration is stopped and the mutant and the unsafe state are added into the map unsafes (Line 15). If no unsafe state could be found, nil is inserted and the mutant is considered to be equivalent up to the specified depth limit. For s := getInitState(as) 5: visited := {} 6:
while s = nil do visited := visited ∪ s 13: s := findNextState(as, s, visited )
14:
end while 15: unsafes.add (asm, u) 16 
for all s ∈ states do unsafes.add (asm, u) 16: end for 17: return unsafes the next mutant, state space exploration is performed again. For the sake of simplicity, we omitted the recording of the traces to the unsafe states here.
An advantage of Alg. 1 is that the state space is explored on demand, i.e., it is only explored until an unsafe state is found and not fully up to the given depth. For small sets of mutants, this is appropriate. For large sets of mutants, it is not very clever as the same state space is explored again and again. An alternative is to pre-compute all reachable states up to the given depth and then search for unsafe states in this set. Exploring the full state space up to the given depth is not really an overhead. It is done for equivalent mutants anyway. The probability that a large set of mutants contains at least one equivalent mutant is rather high.
Alg. 2 describes the refinement check with a pre-computed state space. It takes the same input as Alg. 1 and results in the same output. Again, all action systems are supposed to be in normal form. In contrast to Alg. 1, Alg. 2 explores the state space only once and then reuses the reached states during mutation analysis. The procedure findAllStates (Line 2) works analogously to findNextState of Alg. 1, but does not return one reachable state after the other. Instead, it returns the full set of reachable states at once. Afterwards, iteration over the mutants starts (Line 3), where each of the reached states (Line 7) is tested whether it is an unsafe state (Line 8). Once an unsafe state is found, we save the result (Line 9), stop searching for unsafe states (Line 10), and proceed with the next mutant without exploring the state space again. solver .push(mut act)
12:
for all s ∈ states do 13: solver .push(v = s) solver .pop()
20:
end for 21: unsafes.add (asm, u)
22:
solver .pop() 23: end for 24: return unsafes
Incremental Solving
Incremental solving is a technique to efficiently solve several constraints c 1 , ..., c n that have large parts in common. The constraints are related by the adding/removal of small parts. Incremental solving exploits the findings made during solving the constraint c i for solving the subsequent constraint c i+1 [18] .
Our refinement check is well suited to exploit incremental solving, which is already supported by most SMT solvers. Unfortunately, our used constraint solver does not offer such a functionality out of the box. Nevertheless, as we use Prolog as a programming language we were able to implement incremental solving using constraint logic programming and backtracking. Analogously to the incremental solving interface of SMT solvers, the constraint store is regarded to be a stack, where constraints can be pushed (posted) or popped (retracted). The method solve succeeds if the current store is satisfiable and a model may be retrieved. Otherwise, the constraints in the store are unsatisfiable and solve returns false.
Alg. 2 incr is a more detailed version of Alg. 2 and gives additional information on the application of incremental solving. In Line 2, the original action system is translated. The resulting constraint system represents its transition relation (trans rel ). It is posted to the constraint solver's store (Line 3). In Line 4, the state space is explored. The procedure findAllStates starts at the initial state of as and recursively searches for all possible successor states. It uses the solve method and can reuse the transition relation that is already in the constraint store. As the state space is now fully explored (up to a given depth limit), the transition relation is not needed any more and can be removed from the store (Line 5). In exchange, the negated transition relation is required for each refinement check with a mutant (cf. Theorem 1). It is added to the store in Line 6. The actual refinement check starts in Line 7. It iterates over the set of mutants. In Line 9, findMutatedAction syntactically compares the original and the mutated action system. Thereby, it identifies the mutated ac-tion a m , which represents the second part of our non-refinement constraint (cf. Section 3). It is translated into constraints (Line 10) and added to the solver's store (Line 11), which now contains the complete non-refinement constraint for the current mutant. The loop in the Lines 12 to 20 performs the search for an unsafe state in the list of reachable states. Each state s is used as the pre-state v of the non-refinement constraint (Line 13). If the current constraint store is satisfiable, we just found an unsafe state -a state from which the mutant behaves in a way that is not specified by the original (Lines 14 and 15 ). In this case we stop iterating over the states (Line 17). In any case, the constraint v = s is removed from the store (Line 16 and Line 19 respectively). To process the next mutant, the part of the non-refinement constraint that is specific to the current mutant has to be removed from the store (Line 22).
Alg. 2 incr shows that both the reachability analysis and the check for unsafe states are well suited to exploit incremental solving. During reachability, the transition relation is solved again and again -only the pre-states change (Line 4). While testing states whether they are unsafe, the non-refinement constraint has to be solved repeatedly -again with changing pre-states (Line 13). Each non-refinement constraint contains the negated original (Line 6). Thus, when processing several mutants, there is a common part remaining in the store.
Incremental solving in Alg. 1 works analogously. Hence, we do not go into detail here. Its definition can be found in Appendix A. Note that we will use Alg. 1 incr to refer to the incremental version of Alg. 1 in the following.
Analysis of Optimisations
Roughly speaking, all of our refinement checking approaches with/without optimisations are in the same class of complexity. As we need to check for the satisfiability of constraint systems, we are dealing with NP-complete problems.
Nevertheless, we analyse our refinement checking approaches for their potential of improving efficiency. A practicable method is to give the upper bound for the number of constraint solver calls required. The complexity of our problem depends on the number of mutated models (|mutants|), the number of actions defined in the action systems (|actions|), the number of states (|states|), and the number of transitions in the equivalent labelled transition system (|transitions|). It holds that |transitions| ≤ |states| 2 × |actions| × |parameter valuations|. For our unoptimised refinement checker [7] , we call the solver at most once per action for finding the mutated action. For the statespace exploration, the solver is called at most |transitions| + |states| times. This is an upper bound as the exploration is stopped as soon as an unsafe state is found. For this check for unsafe states, the solver is called at most once per state. Hence, the upper bound for the number of solver calls for all mutants is This limit also holds for our first two optimised versions. The normalisation and the application of the one-point rule do not reduce the number of calls to the solver. They only simplify the structure of the constraints given to the solver. This seems to be beneficial (at least for our use cases, cf. Section 6).
The different variable and value selection heuristics are implemented in the constraint solver itself. Hence, they do not influence the number of solver calls either. As we deal with heuristics, the performance strongly depends on the given problems and no general best solution can be predicted. Nevertheless, the variable selection heuristics first-fail principle and most-constrained heuristic are more sophisticated. 
)
This also holds if incremental solving is applied. With incremental solving, parts of the constraint systems can be reused. More specifically, the transition relation of the original action system can be reused at most |transitions|+|states| times. Its negation (for the non-refinement constraints) can be reused for each mutant, i.e., at most |mutants| × |states| times. Finally, we can reuse the constraints for the mutated actions. However, this varies for each mutant. Hence, we can reuse |mutants| constraints. Each for at most |states| times.
Test Case Construction
If the mutated action system does not refine the original, our refinement check provides an unsafe state and a trace leading to this state. In the following, we explain how this trace is extended to a test case.
For testing, we have to distinguish between inputs to the SUT (controllable by the tester) and outputs from the SUT (observable by the tester). The test driver sends a controllable action to the SUT and checks whether only observable actions specified in the test case are returned by the SUT.
As stated in Definition 2, an unsafe state can lead to an incorrect next state or to an incorrect subsequent trace. Our goal is to generate a test case that covers the unsafe state. A test case should have certain properties [19] . In the following, we summarise the properties relevant for this work: In a test case, sink states are verdict states (pass or inconclusive). Note that we produce positive test cases: fail verdicts are implicit, i.e., every observable action not specified by the test case leads to a fail verdict. Thus, the test case is a subset of the behaviour of the original model. We only need the original action system for expanding the trace to a test case. The pass verdict is characterised by successfully passing an unsafe state. After an unsafe state the test case has to check that only specified observable actions may occur. Hence, we have to extend the trace to the unsafe state by all observable actions that are enabled at the unsafe state in the original model.
For non-deterministic systems, we additionally need inconclusive verdicts. Reaching an inconclusive verdict does not mean that the test case failed, but that the test purpose could not be reached in the test run. For example, with non-deterministic models the SUT may choose between several possible output actions. If only one of them leads to the test purpose, but the SUT chooses another one, the SUT behaves correctly but cannot reach the test purpose any more. We augment our test cases with inconclusive verdicts in the following way: we follow the trace to the unsafe state. At each state, we test whether alternative observable actions are enabled. If this is the case, we add a transition leading to an inconclusive verdict for each additional observable action.
As in the ioco conformance relation [20] , we also use an additional observable action δ meaning quiescence. It is enabled whenever there are no other observable actions. In our test cases it may appear only before pass verdicts. Earlier in the test case, it cannot be enabled whenever there are other observable actions. If there is a controllable action in the test case, the tester sends the input to the SUT immediately without waiting to check for quiescence.
Note that we do not need to add transitions for alternative controllable actions. They are controlled by the tester, who does not want to deviate from the path leading to the test purpose. So another property of test cases is that they do not contain choices over controllable actions [20] .
Example 2. Figure 5 depicts the construction of a test case for a simple car alarm system. The left-hand side shows the trace to the unsafe state. When all doors of the car are closed and locked, the system gets armed after 20 seconds. If the car is opened in this state, the system is disarmed and an acoustic and an optical alarm are turned on. After 30 seconds, the sound is turned off. After 270 seconds, the unsafe state is reached. This trace is first extended by pass verdicts. In our example, two observable actions are enabled in the unsafe state: FlashOff and SoundOff (middle of Figure 5 ). Finally, we add inconclusive verdicts. In our example, the activation of the alarms may happen in arbitrary order. SoundOn is already part of the test case. We add a transition labelled by FlashOn leading to an inconclusive verdict. The final test case is depicted at the right-hand side of Figure 5 . Note that this car alarm system is subject to our experiments and will be described in more detail in the next section.
We distinguish two classes of test cases: linear and adaptive test cases. Linear test cases contain exactly one path to the unsafe state. Since a model's behaviour may branch, an observation may lead away from the linear path. In this case, the test has to be stopped with an inconclusive verdict. In contrast, adaptive test cases integrate several paths to the unsafe state into one test case. They only give an inconclusive verdict if it is impossible to reach the unsafe state. At the moment, we construct linear test cases. A disadvantage thereof is that when executed they result more often in inconclusive verdicts than adaptive test cases. A linear test case might result in an inconclusive verdict although it is still possible to reach the unsafe state by an alternative path. However, adaptive test cases may be cyclic making them harder to handle in test drivers [19] . This is often not desired by industry.
We generate abstract test cases that are on the same level as the test model. To be executed, they need to be mapped to the concrete interface level of the SUT. This can be done by mapping them to concrete test cases (e.g. JUnit) or by implementing a test driver doing this on the fly during test case execution.
Experimental Results
Car Alarm System
For our experiments, we used a simplified version of a car alarm system (CAS). The following requirements served as the basis for our model: R1 Arming. The system is armed 20 seconds after the vehicle is locked and the bonnet, luggage compartment, and all doors are closed. R2 Alarm. The alarm sounds for 30 seconds if an unauthorised person opens the door, the luggage compartment, or the bonnet. The hazard flasher lights will flash for five minutes. R3 Deactivation The anti-theft alarm system can be deactivated at any time, even when the alarm is sounding, by unlocking the vehicle from outside. Figure 6 : UML state machine of the car alarm system Figure 6 shows a UML state machine of our CAS. Starting at state OpenAndUnlocked one can traverse to ClosedAndLocked by closing all doors and locking the car. As specified in R1, the system is armed after 20 seconds in ClosedAndLocked. Upon entry of the Armed state, the method AlarmArmed.SetOn is called. Upon leaving the state (either by unlocking the car or by opening a door), AlarmArmed.SetOff is called. Similarly, when entering the Alarm state, the optical and acoustic alarms are enabled. When leaving the Alarm state, either via a timeout or via unlocking the car, both acoustic and optical alarm are turned off. Note that the order of these two events is not specified, neither for enabling nor for disabling the alarms. Hence the system is not deterministic. When leaving the alarm state after a timeout (cf. R2) the system returns to the Armed state only if it receives a close signal. Turning off the acoustic alarm after 30 seconds, as specified in R2, is reflected in the time-triggered transition leading to the Flash sub-state of the Alarm state.
Mutations and Experimental Setup. We basically repeated our previous experiments [7] . We modelled the CAS described above as an action system and then manually created first order mutants (one mutation per mutant) of the model. We applied three mutation operators: (1) We set all possible guards to true (34 mutants). (2) We swapped all equal and unequal operators (56 mutants). (3) We incremented all integer constants by 1, whereas we took the smallest possible value at the upper bound of a domain, in order to avoid domain violations (116 mutants). Additionally, we also included the original action system as an equivalent mutant. This gave us a total of 207 mutants. This slightly differs from our previous experiments [7] , where we had to exclude 12 mutants since the constraints given to the solver could not be processed within a reasonable amount of time. Due to our presented optimisations, this is not necessary any more. All 207 mutants are subject to our experiments.
There exist four slightly different versions of our CAS model: (1) CAS 1 : , and 2700), (3) CAS 100 : the CAS with parameters multiplied by 100, and (4) CAS 1000 : the CAS with parameters multiplied by 1000. These extended parameter ranges shall test the capabilities of our symbolic approach. Our experiments were conducted on a MacBook Pro with an Intel i7 dual-core processor (2.8 GHz) and 8 GB RAM with a 64-bit operating system. In the following, we present the results from our improved refinement checker, compare them with the results obtained with our preliminary version [7] , and with results obtained with our explicit (non-symbolic) conformance checker Ulysses [19, 21] . Ulysses is a mutation-based test case generator and works with action systems, too. Nevertheless, this comparison is not totally fair: (1) Ulysses generates adaptive test cases, we generate linear test cases (cf. Section 5). (2) Ulysses uses a different conformance relation named ioco (input-output conformance [20] ).
Quantifier Elimination and Normal Form
In an earlier version of our refinement checker, we could not cope with all 207 mutants [7] . For 12 mutants, the constraints given to the solver could not be processed within a reasonable amount of time. The remaining 195 mutants could be handled in about 100 seconds. This is an average of 0.5 seconds per mutant. The maximum runtime for one mutant was around 3 seconds. Table 1 lists the results of our improved refinement checker, which normalises the action systems and applies the one-point rule. For each car alarm system (CAS 1, CAS 10, CAS 100, and CAS 1000), we give the time needed to process all 207 mutants (Σ), the average time needed for one mutant (φ), and the maximum amount of time needed for one mutant (max). For our refinement checker, we divide the execution time into two parts: (1) the time to find the mutated action, i.e., for checking whether there possibly exists an unsafe state and which action has been mutated (column 1: find mutated action), and (2) the time needed for the combined reachability and non-refinement check (column 2: reach & non-refine). The sum thereof results in the overall execution time for refinement checking (column total ). Table 1 also lists the runtimes for the explicit ioco checker Ulysses. Note that the explicit checker cannot deal with CAS 100 and CAS 1000 in a reasonable amount of time.
With our improved refinement checker it is possible to deal with all 207 mutants, which was not possible before [7] . Still, the overall execution time could be improved from 100 seconds to 41 seconds for CAS 1. This means that our improved implementation is more than twice as fast. It is also faster than Ulysses, which needs 103 seconds. Nevertheless, this version of our refinement checker does not scale any more. For CAS 10 it needs already 179 seconds, then half an hour for CAS 100, and finally approximately 4 hours for CAS 1000. Note that Table 1 does not contain minimum values as they are 0 ms for our refinement checker, i.e., not measurable in practice. For Ulysses, they are also below 0.5 seconds. Note that most mutants can be dealt within a small amount of time. Outliers rise the average value. For our refinement checker, the arithmetic mean is between 13 seconds for CAS 1 and 3.4 hours for CAS 1000. In contrast, the median value is 0.12 to 0.15 seconds for each CAS version and 75% of the mutants can be dealt with in ≤ 0.17 to 0.23 seconds per mutant. For Ulysses, the situation is similar. 75% of the mutants can be dealt with in ≤ 0.5 seconds per mutant for CAS 1 and in ≤ 6 seconds per mutant for CAS 10. More details can be found in Table B .11 in Appendix B.
When comparing our refinement checker improved by the one-point-rule with our previous version [7] , we can make another observation. The older version was rather fast in finding the mutated action -about 15 seconds for the 195 mutants for each CAS version. This was not much compared to the time needed for the combined reachability and non-refinement check, which took about 90 seconds for the 195 mutants. Now, finding the mutated action takes more than half of the time for the total refinement checking process and this already for the smallest CAS. For the largest CAS, it even takes 4.2 hours for the 207 mutants, while the combined reachability and non-refinement check stays rather constant (18 -23 seconds per CAS version for all mutants).
Variable and Value Selection Heuristics
We experimented with the constraint solver's search strategy by trying different combinations of variable and value selection strategies (see Section 4.2). Variable selection strategies include: (1) leftmost, which selects variables from left to right, (2) ff -the first-fail principle, and (3) ffc -the most-constrained heuristic. For value selection, up or down may be chosen, i.e., values are either selected in ascending or in descending order.
We tried all six combinations of these variable and value selection strategies. The runtimes of our refinement checker using the default setting (leftmost-up) were already reported in Table 1 . The execution times in seconds for the others are listed in Table 2 (and in more detail in Table B .12 in Appendix B). Again, we partition the total runtime into the time needed for finding the mutated action Table 2 : Execution times of our refinement checker using different variable/value selection strategies for the four CAS versions. "1" stands for "find mutated action", "2" for "reach & non-refine", and "total" is the sum thereof. All values are given in seconds. CAS "1 " and the time for the combined reachability and non-refinement check "2 ". Note that the default setting leftmost-up is the worst setting for our example. It takes up to 3.4 hours to deal with one mutant of the CAS 1000 model (see Table 1 ). As can be seen from Table 2 , also leftmost-down does not scale for larger parameter domains. For CAS 100 and CAS 1000, some mutants take particularly long. For example, for CAS 1000 the maximum time spent on one mutant is 509 seconds, which is the main part of the time needed for all mutants. 75% of all mutants do not take longer than 0.17 seconds per mutant. While leftmost-up also showed outliers, the other four combinations did not. In general, the first-fail principle (ff ) as well as the most-constrained heuristic (ffc) show good results regardless of the value selection strategy and the size of the variable domains. This makes sense as these heuristics are more sophisticated than the static selection of the leftmost variable. They adapt to the current state of the search and select the next variable dynamically. Nevertheless, the combination leftmost-down may also accomplish good results. For example, it achieves the shortest runtimes (27 and 31 seconds respectively) for CAS 1 and CAS 10. For CAS 100 and CAS 1000, ffc-up, i.e., the combination of the most-constrained heuristic and the ascending order for value selection, is the fastest combination. So there is no setting that performs best for all CAS versions. Nevertheless, using the first-fail principle or the most-constrained heuristic seems to be the best choice in general. They scale for all four CAS versions (although CAS 100 seems to be a small outlier). We will check this hypothesis in our second experiment (Section 6.2). Note that we also tried the different variable and value selection strategies for our "old" refinement checker [7] . Our experiments showed that it was still Table 3 : Execution times for the CAS case study with our refinement checker using syntactic analysis for finding the mutated action ("1") . Time values for "reach & non-refine" are missing as they are almost the same as in not possible to process all 207 mutated action systems within a timeout of one hour. Hence, the normalisation of action systems and the application of the one-point rule is really needed to achieve this essential performance gain.
Mutation Detection Strategies
Although the above results are already promising, they can be further improved. As can be seen in Table 2 , the time needed for finding the mutated action "1 " still takes a considerable amount of time (33 -97% of the total time needed for refinement checking). As already proposed in Section 4.3, a syntactic analysis to find the mutated action should solve this problem. Table 3 lists the execution times in seconds needed for syntactic mutation detection "1 " for our four CAS versions and the six combinations of variable and value selection strategies. Syntactic mutation detection leads to runtimes that are drastically decreased compared to semantical mutation detection using the constraint solver. For each CAS version and for each combination of variable/value selection strategies, the time to find the mutated action for all 207 mutants is below one second. Hence, the total time needed for refinement checking now basically consists of the time needed for the combined reachability and non-refinement check. For this Step "2 " of our process, we have omitted the runtimes in Table 3 as they are almost the same as in Table 2 . Using syntactic mutation detection, we achieved runtimes of 19 -23 seconds to process all 207 mutated models for each version of the CAS. Hence, the settings for the constraint solver on how to choose variables and values have become irrelevant. A more detailed version of Table 3 can be found in Appendix B (Table B. 13).
Pre-computation of Reachable States
All results presented so far were based on Alg. 1, where the state space of the original action system was explored for each mutant. In Section 4.4, we proposed a pre-computation of all reachable states up to a certain depth (Alg. 2). Table 4 gives an overview of the computation times for all mutants of each CAS version using the combination of the most-constrained heuristic with ascending value selection. Row "Alg. 1" restates the execution times needed without the pre-computation of reachable states with syntactic mutation analysis (cf . Table 3 ). Additionally, Table 4 gives values for Alg. 2, which performs the reachability analysis only once. Here, we divide the total runtime into (1) the time needed for the state space exploration ("reach"), which is performed only once for all mutants, and (2) the time needed to find an unsafe state in the set of pre-computed states ("find unsafe"). The total runtime is a bit higher than the sum of these two items as it also contains I/O operations as parsing or logging of the results. For each CAS version, the time needed for refinement checking 207 mutants could be further decreased from about 20 seconds to approximately 7 seconds by the pre-computation of the state space.
Incremental Solving
Our last suggested improvement concerned the use of incremental solving as explained in Section 4.5. We implemented incremental versions of Alg. 1 as well as of Alg. 2 resulting in Alg. 1 incr and Alg. 2 incr. The execution times of these two algorithms on the CAS case study are given in Table 4 . Alg. 1 incr achieves runtimes from 2.82 to 8.55 seconds for checking refinement of 207 mutants. The runtimes are not constant with increasing domains of the parameters. Alg. 2 incr performs better. It is faster (less than 3 seconds per CAS version) and the runtime is constant. Again, the options ffc-up were used for constraint solving as our experiments in Section 6.1.2 indicate that this combination is a reasonable choice.
We clearly outperform the explicit ioco checker Ulysses, for which the runtimes to process the 207 mutated models have already been given in Table 1 . Ulysses needs 103 seconds for the simplest CAS version. Already for CAS 10, it exceeds its limits and needs around 8 hours. 
Test Case Construction
We implemented the expansion of counterexample traces to test cases as described in Section 5 and evaluated it in two settings: without (Alg. 1 incr) and with (Alg. 2 incr) the pre-computation of the state space. Again, all experiments were run using the ffc-up strategy. Both algorithms result in the same set of test cases. They report 30 equivalent mutants up to the maximum exploration depth of the system, which is 13. They generate one test case per non-equivalent mutant, i.e., 177 test cases are generated. Thereof, 158 are duplicates of others and 19 unique test cases remain. Table 5 gives the execution times for both algorithms for all four CAS versions. Column "tr to tc" states the time needed for the test case construction for all 207 mutants. It is approximately 2 seconds for each CAS version for Alg. 1 incr. Alg. 2 incr is slightly faster, which can mainly be explained by different result logging behaviour of the two algorithms. Column "total " gives the overall time needed for test case generation (refinement check plus test case construction).
To sum up, our test case generation is fast for the CAS case study, but it results in a large amount of test cases for a system of that size. Anyway, most of them are duplicates and can simply be removed by file comparison tools. For future work, we plan to avoid the generation of redundant tests, e.g., by checking whether existing test cases are able to kill remaining model mutants [19] .
Particle Counter: An Industrial Use Case
We repeated all of our experiments conducted on the car alarm system on a second use case from the automotive domain: a particle counter. We created an action system that models the control logic of a device counting the particles in the exhaust gas of combustion engines 2 . The particle counter use case serves as a demonstrator in the TRUFAL project 3 and is provided by the industrial partner AVL 4 . The system measures the particle number concentration of the exhaust gas drawn from a sampling line. The user can choose between continuously measuring the current concentration and accumulating the total particle counts. During the measurement the ratio by which the exhaust gas is mixed with particle-free dilution air during the measurement, can be adjusted. Additionally, there is a command to measure pure, particle-free air to check whether the sensors are correctly calibrated. Other commands are provided for necessary maintenance tasks like a leakage test, a response check, or for the manual purging of the sampling line.
In total, the system distinguishes between eight different operating states, including two idle states Pause and Standby. Additionally, there are two different communication modes Manual for controlling the particle counter directly via the buttons at the device and Remote for controlling the system remotely via a client. Also, after a command is sent, the system switches from a Ready to a Busy status for a certain time in which the command is processed.
The system receives commands from the user interface and shows its current state and each change between different internal modes. Commands from the user may be rejected due to several reasons: (a) the command may not be available in the current operating state, (b) the system may be in the wrong communication mode, or (c) the system may be busy. In each case, the system returns an appropriate error message.
The system starts in the Pause operating state being Ready to start new operations and in a Manual communication state. In order to accept commands via the testing interface, it has to be set into the Remote communication state by providing the input SetRemote.
For example, a possible scenario would be to start the measurement, adjust the dilution ratio, switch the measurement method to accumulating the total particle counts and turn the measurement off again. Including the operations for switching the system into the right modes and observing all the outputs from the system, a test case performing this scenario would take 26 steps.
To illustrate the complexity of the model, Table 6 relates some model metrics of this industrial use case to the corresponding values of the car alarm system presented in Section 6.1. The model of the particle counter consists of 26 actions and 10 state variables compared to 11 actions and 6 state variables of the model of the CAS. Considering the domains of these variables this leads to a combinatorial state space of ∼ 1.6 × 10 9 possible state variable valuations for the particle counter compared to 1600 possible state variable valuations for the CAS. However, only 1725 of them are actually reachable compared to 21 reachable states of the CAS. Since our search is bounded, the chosen exploration depth is important. In order to reach all possible states in the particle counter model, an exploration depth of 28 is required, for the car alarm system it is 13. We measure the exploration depth in number of events in a trace. In our experiments, we used these required exploration depths to limit our search. Hence, we could fully explore both systems. Note that if the used model is too complex and the state space cannot be fully explored, we might miss mutations that can only be observed deep in the system. This is a general problem of bounded techniques, e.g., bounded model checking [22] .
Mutations and Experimental Setup. From the model described above we again generated first order mutants. We used the same mutation operators as for our CAS experiments: setting guards to true resulted in 101 mutants, swapping Table 7 : Execution times of our refinement checker for the particle counter based on Alg. 1 using semantic and syntactic mutation detection strategies. All six variable/value selection strategies were run. "1" stands for "find mutated action", "2" for "reach & non-refine", and "total" is the sum thereof. equal and unequal operators resulted in 249 mutants, and incrementing integer constants by one resulted in 322 mutants. In total, we obtained 672 mutants. We conducted our particle counter experiments on the same machine we already used for the car alarm system. Hence, the runtimes are comparable between the two case studies.
Quantifier Elimination and Normal Form, Variable and Value Selection
Heuristics, and Mutation Detection Strategies Table 7 refers to our first three optimisations applied on the particle counter use case. It contains values for the runtimes of two different implementations of our refinement checker: one uses semantic mutation detection, the second uses syntactic mutation detection (cf. Section 4.3). Both use quantifier elimination and Alg. 1, i.e., they explore the state space several times (once for each mutant). Both implementations were run six times with varying configurations for the constraint solver. For each configuration, we divide the total computation time "total" into two parts: "1" stands for the time needed to find the mutated action, and "2" represents the time needed for the combined reachability and non-refinement check.
The implementation using semantic mutation detection performed rather poor. For none of the six constraint solver strategies, it managed to check all 672 mutants for refinement with the original model in a reasonable amount of time. We quit the execution of each run after a timeout of 6 hours. The progress can be represented in terms of mutants being processed. For no configuration, more than 8 mutants could be handled within 6 hours. As in the CAS case study (cf. Table 2), the vast majority of the overall computation time is needed for finding the mutated action. Again, syntactic mutation analysis resolves this problem. Each constraint solver configuration achieves almost equally good results: 1.8 to 2.2 hours for checking all 672 mutants. This is an average of ∼10 to ∼12 seconds per mutant. Again, there are a couple of mutants taking longer than most others. The median value for checking one mutant is around 2 seconds. 75% of the mutants can be processed in ≤ 14 to 20 seconds per mutant. The time needed for finding the mutated actions shrank from several hours to a few seconds and takes almost equally long for each mutant. As in the CAS experiment, the strategy ffc-up still belongs to the fastest strategies. Table B .14 in Appendix B is a more detailed version of Table 7 . Table 8 addresses our last two optimisations. We ran all experiments with two constraint solver configurations: ffc-up, which performed very good for the CAS (cf. Table 2) , and leftmost-down, which achieved the best results for the particle counter with syntactic mutation detection (cf. Table 7 ). The first data row (Alg. 1) restates the execution times from Table 7 for these two strategies. Alg. 2 improves Alg. 1 by exploring the state space of the original action system only once (cf. Section 4.4). For Alg. 2, the table distinguishes between various sub-tasks. The row "reach" states the time needed for the exploration of the state space up to depth 28. The row "find unsafe" gives the time required to check these states for non-refinement. The row "total " states the overall time needed for the refinement check. For Alg. 1, we cannot make this distinction since these tasks are entangled. The computation of the state space takes almost 1 minute for both solver strategies. For 672 mutants, it is a considerable performance reduction to do it just once. The runtimes could be reduced from almost 2 hours to about 45 minutes, a reduction of ∼58%. Table 8 further contains our results regarding the exploitation of incremental solving (cf. Section 4.5). The incremental version of Alg. 1 achieves runtimes of 32 and 33 minutes respectively. It is faster than Alg. 2. Hence, incremental solving was able to reduce the runtime from almost two hours to half an hour for the algorithm re-exploring the state space for each mutant. This is a reduction of almost 75%. For Alg. 2, which explores the state space only once, incremental solving reduced the runtime from 45 to 2 minutes. Here, the performance gain is even higher: a reduction by 95%. For the incremental algorithms, the pre-computation of the state space reduces the runtime from 32 to 2 minutes, meaning a reduction by ∼94%. Each setting produced some outliers. For example, Alg. 1 using strategy ffc-up has an arithmetic mean of 10.2 seconds, whereas the median value is less than 2 seconds. 75% of the mutants could be processed in ≤ 17 seconds per mutant. Again, we included more details in Appendix B (Table B .15). Table 9 contains the runtimes required for the test case generation from the particle counter model. Again, we used the two solver configurations ffc-up and leftmost-down. For both Alg. 1 incr and Alg. 2 incr, the time needed to create all test cases is almost the same: ∼25 seconds for the ffc-up configuration and 31 to 34 seconds for the leftmost-down configuration. The overall test case generation time including the refinement check and the expansion from the resulting traces into valid test cases takes approximately 31 minutes for Alg. 1 incr and 2.2 to 2.6 minutes for Alg. 2 incr. Hence, the expansion from traces to test cases almost consumes no runtime compared to the refinement check. It does not produce significant outliers (cf. Table B.16 in Appendix B). Similar to the CAS case study, the number of generated test cases is rather high and the resulting test suite contains a lot of duplicates. For the particle counter, 121 of the mutated action systems were equivalent. For each of the remaining 551 non-equivalent mutants one test case has been generated. 53 of these test cases remain after removing 498 duplicates.
Pre-computation of Reachable States and Incremental Solving
Test Case Construction
Again, we also used the explicit ioco checker Ulysses. To generate test cases from the 672 mutants of the particle counter, Ulysses needed approximately 40 hours using an exploration depth of 28 (same as for our refinement checker). Hence, the average time for one mutant is about 3.6 minutes. Due to this long computation time, we transferred this experiment to a server machine different from the desktop machine where all the other experiments were conducted. The server has two 2.5 GHz quad-core processors and 32 GB RAM. Still in one case, the test case generation for one particular mutant failed due to a lack of memory. Processing this mutant took 1.3 hours until it ran out of memory. This was also the maximum amount of time for processing one single mutant.
To sum up, the particle counter case study showed that we could again drastically reduce execution times. Our most optimised test case generator based on refinement checking achieved a runtime of 2.2 minutes. In contrast, the explicit test case generator Ulysses needed 40 hours.
Related Work
To our knowledge, this is the first test case generation approach that deals with non-deterministic systems, uses mutations, and is based on constraint solving techniques. Nevertheless, there exist various works overlapping in one or several aspects. There are constraint-based test case generation approaches on the source code level, where no non-determinism has to be considered. For example, there is a mutation-based approach [23] , which mutates Java-like programs and transforms them into constraints via SSA form to generate distinguishing test cases. Gotlieb et al. do not use mutations, but structural criteria for test data generation via SSA form working with constraint solving [24] and with CLP [25] .
Regarding black-box techniques, one of the first models to be mutated were predicate-calculus specifications [26] and Z specifications [27] . Later on, model checkers were used to check temporal formulae expressing equivalence between original and mutated models. If non-equivalent, this leads to counterexamples that serve as test cases [28] . Most test case generation approaches using model checkers deal with deterministic systems. Nevertheless, there also exist works considering non-determinism and the involved difficulties. Okun et al. [29] suggest to synchronise non-deterministic choices in the original and the mutated model via common variables to avoid false positive counterexamples. Boroday et al. [30] propose two approaches to cope with non-determinism: modular model checking of a composition of the mutant and the specification, and incremental test generation via observers and traditional model checking. Another work [31] considers non-determinism. It uses the model/refinement checker for FDR (Failures-Divergence Refinement) for the CSP process algebra [32] to generate test cases. However, this approach is not mutation-based.
Other model-based mutation testing techniques considering non-determinism include two ioco (input-output conformance [20] ) checkers for LOTOS specifications [33] and (qualitative) action systems [21] . Both are not symbolic, but rely on explicit state space enumeration. For a detailed survey on mutation testing incl. test case generation based on mutations, we refer to Jia and Harman [1] .
In our symbolic approach using a constraint solver in Prolog, we implemented support for incremental solving. Incremental solving has already been applied 
Conclusion
We presented five techniques to decrease the execution time of our refinement checker for non-deterministic action systems: Firstly, we implemented quantifier elimination via disjunctive normal form transformation and the one-point rule.
The experiment with the car alarm system shows that we can now deal with all 207 mutants and that the execution time could be reduced to 41 seconds for the simplest model. However, for larger time parameters the tool still runs for 4.2 hours. Secondly, we experimented with different search strategies of the constraint solver. The best strategy reduced the execution time to 27 seconds. However, there is a great variety and it is hard to decide which strategy works best for which model. We noticed that the semantic check for finding the mutated action causes this variety and, thirdly, added a syntactic search leading to almost constant execution time for all models and all search strategies. As a result, the refinement checker is able to check all 207 mutants in 19 seconds. This could be even further reduced by reusing the computed state space for each mutant, which led to a runtime of approximately 7 seconds. Finally, we implemented incremental solving, which is well-known from SMT solvers, in Prolog. This reduced the runtime to less than 3 seconds for processing all 207 mutants of the car alarm system.
We are aware that one example is not sufficient to generalise. Therefore, we also presented empirical results for an industrial use case from the automotive domain. Again, runtimes could be reduced dramatically from more than 6 hours to 2.2 minutes for 672 mutants. Finally, our highly optimised refinement checker has been used for mutation-based test case generation. At the moment, we produce a large set of test cases that contains many duplicates. The reduction of this high redundancy in the generated test suites will be addressed in future work. Next steps also include the mapping of the generated abstract test cases to concrete test cases to be executed and evaluated on the SUT. Furthermore, the choice of mutation operators pose an interesting field for further research. At the time of print, some parts of these aspects have already been considered in our recent work [34, 35] . Table 10 once more states the runtimes needed for test case generation. Our most optimised test case generator based on refinement needs less than 4 seconds to process 207 mutants of each version of the car alarm system. The explicit test case generator Ulysses needs 1.7 minutes for the simplest car alarm system. For a version of the car alarm system using larger parameter values, the explicit tool already exceeds its limits and needs hours. Also for the particle counter use case, explicit techniques do not scale (40 hours for 672 mutants), while our approach needs only 2.2 minutes for the same set of mutants.
Our work shows that non-determinism can be dealt with. Today, most commercial model-based test case generators exclude non-determinism. This line of research aims for bringing model-based mutation testing into practice -including non-determinism.
Appendix B. Extended Tables
This appendix contains extended versions of the tables from the paper that stated arithmetic mean values. They are extended by values for the quartiles Q 1 /Q 2 /Q 3 . Q 1 represents the first quartile, i.e., quantile with q = 0.25. Q 2 is the second quartile, i.e., the quantile with q = 0.5, which is the median. Q 3 represents the third quartile, i.e., quantile with q = 0.75. The most interesting values were already mentioned in the text describing the original tables. 
